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INTRODUCTION
Subsequent to the 1989 United States Supreme Court decision in
City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co.,' the Minnesota Legislature em-
barked on a review of small business procurement programs in the
t Lilian Ejebe is a staffattorney at Southern Minnesota Legal Services. She is a
graduate of William Mitchell College of Law (J.D. 1990) and the University of Nigeria
(B.L. 1978; LL.B. 1977).
1. 109 S. Ct. 706 (1989).
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state.2 In declaring Richmond's minority business set-aside program
unconstitutional, the Supreme Court inflicted a lethal blow to state
and municipal minority business set-aside programs. For the first
time, a majority of the Court applied a strict scrutiny standard of
review to determine the constitutionality of affirmative action based
on race.3 The Court's holding in Croson is in sharp contrast to its
1980 decision in Fullilove v. Klutznick, 4 where virtually identical feder-
ally mandated set-asides were held to be constitutional. As a result
of Croson, the Minnesota Legislature adjusted its small business set-
aside programs. 5 It also instituted a commission to study the set-
aside issue and to propose legislation that meets the Croson require-
ments. 6 On the basis of the commission's report, the Legislature en-
acted legislation to revise Minnesota's set-aside programs in May
1990.7
The purpose of this comment is to examine the effects of Croson on
small business set-aside programs in Minnesota. The comment will
briefly state the history of affirmative action plans and minority busi-
ness set-asides before Croson. The comment will then review the
Supreme Court decisions in Fullilove and Croson. Finally, the com-
ment will examine the report of the commission and the new
legislation.
I. HISTORY
A. Origin of Affirmative Action Plans
Affirmative action plans are "public or private actions or programs
which provide or seek to provide opportunities or other benefits to
persons on the basis of, among other things, their membership in a
specified group or groups." 8 The publicly perceived goal of an af-
firmative action plan is to remedy the effects of past discrimination
against minorities and women by enhancing their opportunities for
2. Act approved June 2, 1989, ch. 352, 1989 Minn. Laws 3169 (amending and
repealing a number of statutes regulating purchasing from small businesses), amended
by Act approved May 3, 1990, ch. 541, 1990 Minn. Laws 1457 (amending and repeal-
ing statutes concerning certain small businesses and businesses located in economi-
cally disadvantaged areas).
3. See Croson, 109 S. Ct. at 720-21.
4. 448 U.S. 448 (1980). The Fullilove Court held that the set-aside was justified,
inter alia, by congressional powers under the fourteenth amendment. Id. at 449-50.
See also infra text accompanying notes 60-73.
5. Act approved June 2, 1989, ch. 352, sec. 14, 1989 Minn. Laws 3178 (amend-
ing MINN. STAT. § 161.321, subd. 2 (1988)).
6. Id. sec. 1, 1989 Minn. Laws 3169-70.
7. See Act approved May 3, 1990, ch. 541, 1990 Minn. Laws 1457 (amending
and repealing 1989 statutes related to small businesses).
8. Jones, The Genesis and Present Status of Affirmative Action in Employment: Economic,
Legal and Political Realities, 70 IOWA L. REV. 901, 903 (1985).
[Vol. 17
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employment and government programs. 9
The genesis and evolution of affirmative action has been the sub-
ject of much controversy. To bolster their respective positions, pro-
ponents and opponents of affirmative action present different
interpretations of presidential and congressional efforts to advance
racial equality. O
The term "affirmative action" emerged in 1965 with President
Johnson's Executive Order Number 11246.11 The order declared
that the policy of the federal government is "to provide equal oppor-
tunity in [fWederal employment for all qualified persons, to prohibit
discrimination in employment because of race, creed, color, or na-
tional origin.12 This goal would be fully realized through a positive,
continuing program in each executive department and agency."1s
The Executive Order required that government agencies include an
"affirmative action" provision in every contract the government en-
tered. During the contract period, the contractor agreed it would
not discriminate against its employees and applicants. 14 In addition,
the contractor had to promise to "take affirmative action to ensure
that applicants are employed, and that employees are treated during
employment, without regard to their race, creed, color, or national
origin."15
9. Rasnic, The Supreme Court and Affirmative Action: An Evolving Standard or Com-
pounded Confusion?, 14 EMPLOYEE REL. L.J. 175, 176 (1988).
10. "Conflicting opinions regarding the legal definitions and origins of affirma-
tive action ... have existed between those justices who approve of racial and sexual
conscience measures and those who read the law to require 'color blind' application
of the law." Andritzy & Andritzy, Affirmative Action: the Original Meaning, 17 LINCOLN
L. REV. 249, 249 (1987). See also Frankel, Title VII and the Supreme Court: The Evolution
of Affirmative Action, 8 GLENDALE L. REV. 102 (1988) (discussing Supreme Court's
evolving attitude toward affirmative action from Regents of the University of Califor-
nia v. Bakke to Johnson v. Transportation Agency); Jones, "Reverse Discrimination" in
Employment: Judicial Treatment of Affirmative Action Programs in the United States, 25 How.
L.J. 217 (1982) (taking issue with "reverse discrimination" as a concept challenging
the validity of affirmative action); Jones, The Origins of Affirmative Action, 21 U.C. DAVIS
L. REv. 383 (1988) [hereinafter Jones, Origins] (history and origin of affirmative ac-
tion as a remedy and as a program); Scanlon, The History and Culture of Affirmative
Action, 1988 B.Y.U. L. REV. 343 (analyzing failure of affirmative action in law schools);
Schnapper, Affirmative Action and the Legislative History of the Fourteenth Amendment, 71 VA.
L. REV. 753 (1985) (contending fourteenth amendment sets constitutional standards
applicable to race-conscious affirmative action by analyzing Reconstruction programs
and present-day affirmative action programs).
11. Exec. Order No. 11246, 3 C.F.R. § 101 (1964-1965) superseded by Exec. Order




14. Id. § 201.
15. Id. Johnson was not the first president to prohibit discrimination in federal
contracts. In ordering an end to discriminatory practices in federal construction con-
1991]
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Executive Order Number 11246 also authorized the Secretary of
Labor to ensure that government contractors comply with non-dis-
crimination provisions in employment.16 The Secretary created the
Office of Federal Contract Compliance (OFCC) to oversee the non-
discrimination provision.' 7 Due to the nature of the construction in-
dustry, however, the OFCC was unable to develop an effective
method of ensuring minority employment in construction
contracts. 18
The OFCC developed special area plans to deal with employment
discrimination in construction contracts. 19 Between 1966 and 1969,
plans were instituted in Cleveland and Philadelphia.20 When the
Philadelphia plan was challenged in federal courts, the Third Circuit
upheld the plan.21 Subsequent challenges to goals and timetables in
the construction industry were also unsuccessful.22
Although the Executive Order attempted to facilitate minority par-
ticipation in government contracting activities, it did not achieve its
goal.23 Thus, in 1977, Congress enacted the Public Works Employ-
ment Act which provided that ten percent of certain federal contracts
be reserved for minority contractors. 24 This statute was the basis for
the litigation in Fullilove.25
tracts in 1941, President Franklin D. Roosevelt, however, did not use the phrase "af-
firmative action." See Rasnic, supra note 9, at 176-77; see also Kruman, Quotas for
Blacks: The Public Works Administration and the Black Construction Worker, 16 LAB. HIST. 37
(1975) (discussing the Roosevelt Administration's attempt to ease discrimination in
the Public Works Administration).
16. See Jones, Origins, supra note 10, at 398.
17. Id.
18. Periodic compliance reviews or employment reports were not suitable for the
construction industry. Id. at 400.
19. See Leiken, Preferential Treatment in the Skilled Building Trades: An Analysis of the
Philadelphia Plan, 56 CORNELL L. REV. 84, 89 (1970).
20. Id.
21. Grounds for challenging the plan included that it violated the fifth and four-
teenth amendments to the Constitution and exceeded the Secretary of Labor's au-
thority under the Executive Order. See Contractors Ass'n of E. Pa. v. Secretary of
Labor, 442 F.2d 159 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 854 (1971).
22. See, e.g., Southern Ill. Builders Ass'n v. Ogilvie, 471 F.2d 680, 681 (7th Cir.
1972) (upholding constitutionality of Ogilvie Plan for recruitment, placement and
training of minorities in the Illinois highway construction industry); Joyce v. Mc-
Crane, 320 F. Supp. 1284, 1288 (D.N.J. 1970) (upholding New Jersey affirmative ac-
tion plan requiring minimum goals for minority participation in government
construction projects).
23. Jones, Origins, supra note 10, at 406.
24. 42 U.S.C. § 6705(f)(2) (1988).
25. Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 453-54 (1980). Prior to 1977, and as far
back as the Reconstruction era, Congress had adopted legislation providing race-
conscious relief. For example, the 1866 Freedmen's Bureau Act authorized the Bu-
reau of Refugees, Freedmen and Abandoned Lands to provide land, buildings, and
funds for the "education of the freed people." Jones, Origins, supra note 10, at 390.
[Vol. 17
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Congress also required that "[l]ocal governments receiving federal
funding for certain projects must comply with regulations mandating
affirmative action in awarding contracts for construction and
purchasing."26 To qualify for federal funds, local governments es-
tablished "programs which set aside a percentage of the local gov-
ernment's contracts or contract funds for minority business
enterprises."27 The set-aside programs established guidelines for
government purchasing and government construction contracts to
minority-owned businesses.28 Before Croson, thirty-six -states and
nearly two hundred cities were administering some sort of racial or
gender and racial based business set-aside program. 29
Generally, state and local governments established two types of
set-aside programs. The first type of program requires a certain per-
centage of the total number of government contracts awarded each
year to be set-aside for minority-owned businesses3o The second
type requires all prime contractors bidding on a contract to spend a
percentage of the contract price in subcontracting to minority-owned
businesses.3 ' Although the details of the programs vary, the goal of
each program is to establish a method for awarding contracts to mi-
nority-owned businesses.
Affirmative action plans have been challenged on fourteenth
amendment (equal protection) groundsS2 and under Title VII of the
In the years from 1896 to the early 1950s, color-conscious legislation provided for
separate but equal benefits. More recently, affirmative action has been seen as "a
modern effort to ensure that the end of segregation is not also the demise of partici-
pation by blacks in the bounties of the country." Id. at 392. In the early 1970s,
Congress required affirmative action for the handicapped in legislation including the
1973 Rehabilitation Act and the Vietnam Era Veterans Readjustment Act. See Rasnic,
supra note 9, at 177.
26. Comment, Set-Asides of Local Government Contracts for Minority Owned Businesses:
Constitutional and State Law Issues, 17 N.M.L. REV. 337, 337 (1987) (In 49 C.F.R.
§§ 23.64, 23.66 (1986), "the Department of Transportation requires a local govern-
ment receiving federal funds to set affirmative action goals for awarding contracts to
minority-owned businesses and to make good faith efforts to meet those goals.").
27. Id.
28. See id. at 338.
29. Hoogland & McGlothen, City of Richmond v. Croson: A Setback for Minority Set-
Aside Programs, 15 EMp. RELATIONs L.J. 5, 14 (1989); Koch, Equal Opportunity-Without
Minority Set-Asides, N.Y. Times, Feb. 20, 1989, at A19.
30. See, e.g., Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448 (1980).
31. See, e.g., City of Richmond v.J.A. Croson Co., 109 S. Ct. 706 (1989). The first
type has been referred to as a "pure" set-aside; the second type is called a "subcon-
tractor goal" set-aside. See Comment, supra note 26, at 337-38.
32. The equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment applies to state
action. The text reads in pertinent part: "[N]o state shall ... deny to any person
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, cl.
1. The due process clause of the fifth amendment subjects the federal government to
equal protection principles. Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 500 (1954). Affirmative
action plans have been successfully attacked on the grounds that such plans are based
19911
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1964 Civil Rights Act.33 Opponents of affirmative action contend
that the programs result in reverse discrimination against non-mi-
norities, while proponents insist the programs are necessary to rem-
edy the effects of discrimination against minorities. 34 The Supreme
Court first confronted the issue of the legality of affirmative action
programs in 1978.35 The Court rendered ten decisions on affirma-
on impermissible racial classifications. See Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438
U.S. 265, 319-20 (1978).
33. SeeJohnson v. Transportation Agency, 480 U.S. 616 (1987); Local 28, Sheet
Metal Workers' Int'l Ass'n v. EEOC, 478 U.S. 421 (1986); Steelworkers v. Weber,
443 U.S. 193 (1979).
Title VII 703(a) provides:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer-
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise
to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation,
terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's
race, color, religion, sex, or national origin; or
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for em-
ployment in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual
of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an
employee, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1988).
34. See generally Lally-Green, Affirmative Action: Are the Equal Protection and Title VII
Tests Synonymous? 26 DuQ. L. REV. 295 (1988) (arguing that the tests for Title VII and
equal protection challenges are identical, and that courts, in fashioning a Title VII
remedy, should "narrowly tailor" it to eliminate the identical discrimination);
Walthew, Affirmative Action and the Remedial Scope of Title VII: Procedural Answers to Sub-
stantive Questions, 136 U. PA. L. REV. 625 (1987) (positing that discrimination and re-
verse discrimination are not substantively identical and that the Supreme Court
"should, at a minimum, restructure proof requirements to put discrimination and
reverse discrimination plaintiffs on an equal footing in light of the differing effects of
group harm versus individual harm"); Woodside, Walking the Tightrope Between Title
VII and Equal Protection: Public Sector Voluntary Affirmative Action After Johnson and Wygant,
20 URB. 367 (1988) (arguing that affirmative action programs implemented by public
employers are constitutional so long as they do not offend the equal protection
clause of the fourteenth amendment and that the decision in Johnson v. Transporta-
tion Agency, 480 U.S. 616 (1987), sent a strong "negative signal" to reverse discrimi-
nation claimants relying on the equal protection clause to defeat the very purpose of
Title VII, i.e. to encourage equal opportunity); Note, Voluntary Affirmative Action Plans
by Public Employers: The Disparity in Standards Between Title VII and the Equal Protection
Clause, 56 FORDHAM L. REV. 403 (1987) (presenting the view that courts should give
affirmative action plans implemented by public employers the same deference as Ti-
tle VII claims).
35. See Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978). Bakke, a white
male, was refused admission to the University of California Davis Medical School
under the school's affirmative action plan. He sued the university alleging that its
admissions program discriminated against whites and, thus, violated equal protection
guarantees. The Court ordered the medical school to admit Bakke. Four members
of the Court, led by Justice Brennan, found the use of racial quotas in medical school
admissions constitutional. One Justice found the practice unconstitutional. The re-
maining Justices found it invalid on statutory grounds.
[Vol. 17
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tive action programs between 1978 and 1989.36 Two of these opin-
ions, Fullilove and Croson, dealt with minority business set-asides.
B. Minnesota Small Business Procurement Programs Before Croson
Minnesota's business set-aside programs have never been exclu-
sively racially based. Instead, the Minnesota plans have always in-
cluded women and other socially or economically disadvantaged
persons. In 1975, the Minnesota Legislature enacted the Small Busi-
ness Procurement Act (Act).37 The Act directed the Minnesota De-
partment of Administration to set aside a certain percentage of state
contracts to be awarded, where possible, to small businesses owned
and operated by socially or economically disadvantaged (SED) per-
sons.3 8 Similar SED programs were adopted by the legislature and
affected the Minnesota Department of Transportation, the University
of Minnesota and metropolitan agencies.39
36. See City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 109 S. Ct. 706 (1989); Johnson v.
Transportation Agency, 480 U.S. 616 (1987) (finding unconstitutional an affirmative
action plan for hiring and promoting women and minorities); United States v. Para-
dise, 480 U.S. 149 (1987) (affirming a district court order directing the Alabama De-
partment of Public Safety to follow a promotion plan under which 50%o of those
promoted must be black); Local 28, Sheet Metal Workers Int'l Ass'n v. EEOC, 478
U.S. 421 (1986) (finding constitutional a court-ordered affirmative action program
establishing a nonwhite membership goal based on percentage of non-whites in area
labor pool); Local 93, Int'l Ass'n of Firefighters v. City of Cleveland, 478 U.S. 501
(1986) (holding constitutional a court-adopted consent decree providing for "race-
conscious" affirmative action); Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267 (1986)
(finding unconstitutional a layoff provision that protected minority personnel);
Firefighters Local 1784 v. Stotts, 467 U.S. 561 (1984) (reversing court-modified lay-
off plan that resulted in white employees with more seniority being laid off before
black employees); Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448 (1980); United Steelworkers v.
Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (1979) (finding constitutional a private, voluntary affirmative
action plan that reserved 50% of all openings for black employees in in-plant craft-
training programs until the percentage of black craftworkers approximated percent-
age of blacks in local labor force); see also Milliken v. Michigan Road Builders Ass'n,
109 S. Ct. 1333 (1989) (affirming, without rendering an opinion, the decision of the
court of appeals invalidating a minority business set-aside).
See generally Abraham, Some Post-Bakke-and-Weber Reflections on "Reverse Discrimina-
tion," 14 U. RICH. L. REV. 373 (1980) (discussing discrimination and reverse discrimi-
nation); Jones & Lyon, Reverse Discrimination after Bakke and Weber, 14 ARK. LAw. 4
(1980) (reviewing EEOC Guidelines on affirmative action programs by private and
public employers).
37. Small Business Procurement Act, ch. 383, 1975 Minn. Laws 1320 (codified at
MINN. STAT. § 16.081-.086 (1976) and repealed 1984).
38. Id. sec. 3, 1975 Minn. Laws 1321-22 (codified as amended at MINN. STAT.
§ 16.083 (1983)), repealed by Act approved Apr. 25, 1984, ch. 544, 1984 Minn. Laws
927.
39. These set-aside programs ceased operation in April 1989 and were subse-
quently replaced with programs benefiting only economically disadvantaged busi-
nesses. See Act approved June 2, 1989, ch. 352, 1989 Minn. Laws 3169, amended by
1991]
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A "socially and economically disadvantaged person" was defined
as:
[one] who has been deprived of the opportunity to develop and
maintain a competitive position in the economy because of social
or economic disadvantage. This disadvantage may arise from cul-
tural, social or economic circumstances or background, physical lo-
cation if the person resides or is employed in an area declared as a
labor surplus area by the United States department of commerce,
or other similar cause.40
This definition, which was not racial or gender specific, was
amended in 1980 to include "racial minorities, women, or persons
who have suffered a substantial physical disability."41 In 1985, the
definition was amended to include "sheltered workshops and work
activity programs."42 In 1988, the definition was further amended to
include persons "employed in a county in which the median income
for married couples is less than 70% of the state median income for
married couples."43 To participate in the program, a business had
to meet the statutory SED definition, as well as the definition of a
small business. 44
Under the 1988 statute, the Department of Administration was re-
quired to award 9% of total purchases to businesses eligible under
the set-aside program. 45 To reach this goal, the Department was re-
quired to set-aside at least 3% of all procurements for bidding only
by "small businesses owned and operated by socially or economically
disadvantaged persons."46 The Department was empowered to
award a 5% price advantage in bidding on certain purchases.47 The
program also required prime contractors on construction contracts
exceeding $200,000 to subcontract 10% of the contracts to eligible
Act approved May 3, 1990, ch. 541, 1990 Minn. Laws 1457 (amending and repealing
statutes concerning small businesses).
40. Small Business Procurement Act, ch. 383, sec. 2, 1975 Minn. Laws 1321
(codified as amended at MINN. STAT. § 16.082, (1978)), repealed by Act approved Mar.
18, 1980, ch. 361, sec. 5, 1980 Minn. Laws 58.
41. Act approved Mar. 18, 1980, ch. 360, sec. 3, 1979 Minn. Laws 56 (amending
MINN. STAT. § 645.445, subd. 5 (1978)), repealed by Act approved May 3, 1990, ch.
541, sec. 31, 1990 Minn. Laws 1476.
42. Act approved June 4, 1985, ch. 296, sec. 8, 1985 Minn. Laws 1368 (amending
MINN. STAT. § 645.445, subd. 5 (1984)), repealed by Act approved May 3, 1990, ch.
541, sec. 31, 1990 Minn. Laws 1476.
43. Act approved Apr. 26, 1988, ch. 644, sec. 2, 1988 Minn. Laws 880 (amending
MINN. STAT. § 645.445, subd. 5 (1989)), repealed by Act approved May 3, 1990, ch.
541, sec. 31, 1990 Minn. Laws 1476.
44. A small business was defined as one that has 20 or fewer full-time employees
or has one million dollars or less annual gross sales and was not a branch, affiliate or
subsidiary of a large company. MINN. STAT. § 645.445, subd. 2 (1980).
45. MINN. STAT. § 16B.19, subd. 5 (1988).
46. Id.
47. Id. The five percent price advantage is known as preference bidding.
(Vol. 17
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The legislature mandated a procurement program for the Depart-
ment of Transportation in 1977,49 and for the University of Minne-
sota in 1979.50 The 1977 program set aside 2% of the Department
of Transportation's road construction projects for small businesses,
SED small businesses or contractors that guaranteed they would use
such small businesses as subcontractors. 51 The 1979 program re-
quired that 3% of the University of Minnesota's purchases made with
state appropriations be awarded to eligible SED businesses.52
Several metropolitan agencies participated in a set-aside program
that was implemented on January 1, 1989.53 The goal of the agen-
cies was to award 9% of all purchases to eligible businesses either
through set-asides or through a 5% preference in the amounts bid
by eligible businesses. Six percent of all consultant, professional or
technical services contracts was to go to eligible businesses.54 For
contracts over $200,000, the agencies were required to try to sub-
contract 10% of each contract to eligible businesses.55
In Minnesota, set-aside programs were never purely for businesses
owned by racial minorities. Small businesses owned by females,
handicapped and white males residing in labor-surplus areas partici-
pated in the programs.56 The set-aside programs were intended to
help ensure that businesses owned and operated by disadvantaged in-
dividuals received a fair share of state business.57 In 1988, 621 busi-
nesses were certified by the State Department of Administration as
socially or economically disadvantaged. One-hundred-forty-four of
those businesses were owned and operated by minorities, 186 by fe-
48. Id. § 16B.19, subd. 6.
49. Act approved May 20, 1977, ch. 222, sec. 1, 1977 Minn. Laws 359-60 (codi-
fied as amended at MINN. STAT. § 161.321 (1990)).
50. Act approved May 14, 1979, ch. 86, sec. 1, 1979 Minn. Laws 118 (codified as
amended at MINN. STAT. § 137.31 (1990)).
51. Act approved May 20, 1977, ch. 222, sec. 1, 1977 Minn. Laws 359-60 (codi-
fied MINN. STAT. § 161.321, subd. 2 (1978) and subsequently amended several times).
52. Act approved May 14, 1979, ch. 86, sec. 1, 1979 Minn. Laws 118 (codified at
MINN. STAT. § 137.31, subd. 1 (1980) and subsequently amended several times). Fif-
teen percent of the 20% set-aside for small business must go to SED businesses. Id.
(codified at § 137.31, subd. 3).
53. The agencies involved were: the Metropolitan Council, the Metropolitan Air-
ports Commission, the Metropolitan Waste Control Commission, the Metropolitan
Transit Commission, the Metropolitan Sports Facilities Commission and the Re-
gional Transit Board. Act adopted Apr. 27, 1988, ch. 680, secs. 2-3, 1988 Minn.
Laws 1093-94 (codified as amended at MINN. STAT. §§ 473.142; 473.143, subd. 1
(1990)); Act adopted Mar. 19, 1975, ch. 13, sec. 1, 1975 Minn. Laws 73 (codified as
amended at MINN. STAT. § 473.121, subd. 5a (1990)).
54. MINN. STAT. § 473.142(c) (1988) (amended 1990).
55. Id. § 473.142(b).
56. See supra accompanying notes 37-44.
57. See Khalifa v. State, 397 N.W.2d 383, 385 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986).
1991]
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males, and 283 in federally designated labor-surplus areas.58
Before 1989, the constitutionality of the set-aside programs was
not challenged in Minnesota appellate courts. After the 1980
Supreme Court decision in Fullilove, it was reasonable to assume set-
aside programs were constitutional. Thus, when a minority contrac-
tor brought action against the State of Minnesota for failure to set
aside a contract, the constitutionality of the set-aside program was
not in issue.59
II. SUPREME COURT CASES
A. Fullilove v. Klutznick
Fullilove v. Klutznick 6o was the Supreme Court's first cut at minority
business set-aside programs. In Fullilove, the Court considered the
constitutionality of the set-aside program established by the Public
Works Employment Act of 1977.61 Under Section 103(f)(2) of the
Act, at least 10% of the federal funds granted for local public works
projects must be used to employ minority-owned businesses. 62 The
Court held that Congress' findings of past discrimination in the con-
struction industry were sufficient to support a race-conscious affirma-
tive action program.63 Nonetheless, Fullilove did not conclusively
determine the constitutionality of all set-aside programs. Fullilove
dealt with only pure set-asides and did not address the validity of
subcontractor goal set-asides. In addition, the Court did not agree
on an appropriate standard of review.
Fullilove, with its five separate opinions, failed to provide a stan-
dard for evaluating the constitutionality of set-aside programs. Chief
Justice Burger, writing for the plurality, stated that preventing the
perpetuation of the effects of past discrimination was a legitimate
congressional objective. 64 The ChiefJustice stated that any program
using racial criteria to accomplish these goals must be "narrowly tai-
lored to the achievement of that goal." 65 The plurality declined to
adopt a standard, but stated that the set-aside provision survived "a
most searching examination to make sure that it does not conflict
58. 1988 DEPT. OF ADMIN., MINN. SMALL Bus, PROCUREMENT PROGRAM ANN. REP.
3.
59. See Khalifa, 397 N.W.2d at 385-88. The court of appeals held that, although
the plaintiff's expectation that a contract would be awarded to him under the state
set-aside program was reasonable, the expectation was "not a constitutionally pro-
tected property interest." Id. at 389.
60. 448 U.S. 448 (1980).
61. 42 U.S.C. §§ 6701-10 (1988).
62. Id. § 6705(0(2).
63. Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 475.
64. Id. at 473-76.
65. Id. at 480.
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with constitutional guarantees." 66 Three Justices concurred in the
result, but preferred that an "intermediate" standard be applied to
determine whether the set-aside provision was substantially related
to the achievement of important governmental objectives.6 7 Three
Justices dissented, two stating that the set-aside provision violated
the fourteenth amendment of the Constitution.68
Justice Powell, who concurred in the plurality judgment, and
joined Chief Justice Burger's opinion, wrote a separate opinion stat-
ing that in the past the Court had applied a "strict scrutiny" standard
to racial classifications. 69 Justice Powell, however, concluded that
"the Enforcement clauses of the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amend-
ments confer upon Congress the authority to select reasonable reme-
dies ... "70 Justice Powell stated that Congress' "choice of a
remedy should be upheld.., if the means selected are equitable and
reasonably necessary to the redress of identified discrimination."'-7
Courts have developed the following three-part test to measure
the constitutionality of affirmative action legislation. First, the legis-
lative body establishing the program must have the authority to im-
plement such a program; second, the legislative body must make
adequate findings of past discrimination to ensure that the pro-
gram's remedies address effects of past discrimination; and third, the
program must be narrowly tailored to ensure that the set-aside pro-
gram extends no further than needed to remedy discrimination.72
66. Id. at 491.
67. Id. at 519 (Marshall, J., Brennan, J., and Blackmun, J., concurring). The
proper standard of review for programs using racial criteria is whether they "serve
important governmental objectives and are substantially related to achievement of
those objectives." Id.
68. Id. at 531 (Stewart, J. and Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
Justice Stevens stated that the provision violated the due process clause of the
fifth amendment:
If the general language of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment
authorizes this Court to review Acts of Congress under the standards of the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment-a clause that can-
not be found in the Fifth Amendment-there can be no separation-of-pow-
ers objection to a more tentative holding of unconstitutionality based on a
failure to follow procedures that guarantee the kind of deliberation proce-
dures that a fundamental constitutional issue of this kind obviously merits.
Id. at 551-52.
69. Id. at 507.
70. Id. at 510 (emphasis added).
71. Id.
72. The three-part test was adopted in the following cases: South Fla. Chapter of
the Associated Gen. Contractors of America v. Metropolitan Dade County, 723 F.2d
846, 851-52 (11 th Cir. 1984) (affirmative action plan for county contracts contained
in county ordinance); Ohio Contractors Ass'n v. Keip, 713 F.2d 167, 176 (6th Cir.
1983) (minority business enterprise statute sufficiently narrow to satisfy constitu-
tional requirements found controlling in Fullilove); Associated Gen. Contractors of
Cal. v. City of San Francisco, 619 F. Supp. 334, 339 (N.D. Cal. 1985) (ordinance
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In Fullilove, the Supreme Court established that properly struc-
tured set-asides are constitutional. Fullilove inspired the Richmond
City Council to adopt the set-aside program that was challenged in
Richmond v. Croson.73
B. City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co.
The city of Richmond, Virginia, considered implementing a mi-
nority set-aside program in 1983. The Richmond City Council held
a public hearing concerning the plan. The City Council heard testi-
mony that, although the population of Richmond was fifty percent
black, less than one percent of the city's prime construction contracts
had been awarded to minority businesses from 1978 to 1983. Evi-
dence presented at the hearing showed that many contractors' as-
sociations had virtually no minority-owned businesses as members.
A city council member testified that race discrimination was wide-
spread in the construction industry in the Richmond area, Virginia,
and the nation. The city's legal counsel stated that the proposed or-
dinance was constitutional under Fullilove.74
The Richmond City Council adopted the Minority Business Utili-
zation Plan. When the city awarded construction contracts to prime
contractors, the plan required that the contractors subcontract at
least thirty percent of the dollar amount of the contract to one or
more minority business enterprises (MBEs). Waivers of this require-
ment would be granted only if the contractor could demonstrate that
"'every feasible attempt has been made to comply, and.., that suffi-
cient, relevant, qualified Minority Business Enterprises .. .are un-
available or unwilling to participate in the contract . . . .' -75 The
plan was intended to be "remedial" in nature, and was enacted "for
the purpose of promoting wider participation by minority business
enterprises in the construction of public projects."76
providing for affirmative action for women, minorities and local businesses in city
contracting), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 813 F.2d 922 (9th Cir. 1987); Arrington v.
Associated Gen. Contractors of America, 403 So. 2d 893, 900 (Ala. 1981) (city ordi-
nance requiring assurance of nondiscriminatory employment practices by those con-
tracting with the city found invalid), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 913 (1982).
73. City of Richmond v.J.A. Croson Co., 109 S. Ct. 706, 714 (1989). Many lower
courts relied on Fullilove in upholding set-aside programs. See, e.g., South Fla. Chap-
ter of the Associated Gen. Contractors of America v. Metropolitan Dade County, 723
F.2d 846, 850-51 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 871 (1984). Fullilove was cited in
South Florida Chapter as the "most relevant case to our constitutional inquiry." Id.
The court relied on Fullilove for its conclusion that the county need not choose the
least restrictive remedy. Id. at 856.
74. Id. at 714.
75. Id. at 713 (quoting Minority Business Utilization Plan (Contract Clauses) § D,
Exhibit 24, p. 1).
76. Id. (citing RICHMOND, VA., CODE § 12-158(a)).
[Vol. 17
12
William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 17, Iss. 2 [1991], Art. 12
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol17/iss2/12
SET-ASIDE PROGRAMS
Four months after the plan was adopted, Richmond invited bids
on a project concerning plumbing fixtures at the city jail. J.A.
Croson Company was the only bidder on the contract. Croson de-
termined that, to satisfy the 30% quota, the fixtures would have to be
supplied by an MBE. An MBE gave Croson a quotation for the fix-
tures that was substantially higher than the price Croson had in-
cluded in its bid to the city. Richmond refused Croson's request for
a waiver of the MBE requirement. The city also refused to raise the
contract price. The city re-bid the project.77
Croson sued Richmond in federal district court, arguing that Rich-
mond's plan violated the Constitution. The court upheld the plan.
The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed.78 The Fourth Circuit
relied on the Supreme Court's approval of the federal set-aside plan
in Fullilove.79
When Croson sought certiorari from the Supreme Court, the
Court granted the writ, vacated the Fourth Circuit's opinion, and re-
manded the case. 80 On remand, the Fourth Circuit struck down the
set-aside plan, holding that it violated the fourteenth amendment. 8'
The Fourth Circuit found that the city council's hearings failed to
establish a compelling governmental interest.82 It also held that the
percentage of contracts set aside for minority businesses was not
narrowly tailored to accomplish a remedial purpose, but was instead
"chosen arbitraily."83 The Supreme Court affirmed.84
The Supreme Court's opinion was written by Justice O'Connor,
and joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice White. Justices
Stevens and Kennedy joined in part and filed separate concurring
opinions. Justice Scalia concurred only in the judgment and filed a
separate concurrence. Justice Marshall, joined by Justices Brennan
and Blackmun, dissented.85
77. Id. at 715.
78. J.A. Croson Co. v. City of Richmond, 779 F.2d 181 (4th Cir. 1985).
79. Id. at 186-93. The Fourth Circuit accorded great deference to the city coun-
cil's findings just as the Supreme Court had accorded deference to congressional
findings of discrimination in Fullilove. Id. at 188.
80. Croson, 109 S. Ct. at 716. The Court remanded Croson in light of Wygant v.
Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267 (1986). In Wygant, the Court held that absent
evidence of past discrimination by the district, a public school could not use racial
preferences in its layoff decisions. The Court also ruled that findings of societal dis-
crimination must be supported by evidence of prior discrimination by the govern-
ment unit involved. Id. at 274.
81. J.A. Croson Co. v. City of Richmond, 822 F.2d 1355 (4th Cir. 1987).
82. Id. at 1358.
83. Id. at 1360.
84. Croson, 109 S. Ct. at 717.
85. Croson is characteristic of the Supreme Court's recent tendency in discrimina-
tion cases to issue decisions with a principal opinion, multiple concurrences and a
strong dissent. See, e.g., Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267 (1986); Fu~li-
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The majority opinion distinguished Fullilove on the grounds that,
while Congress could regulate the practices of prime contractors on
federally funded local construction projects under the commerce
clause, state and local governments lack such authority.86 Justice
O'Connor stated that a state or local government does not have the
authority to eradicate the effects of past discrimination, unless there
is "some showing of prior discrimination by the governmental unit
involved." 8 7 The majority also determined that courts must apply
the strict scrutiny standard of review to these state and municipal set-
aside programs. 88 Justice O'Connor observed that strict scrutiny was
particularly appropriate in this case in view of the political power
wielded by blacks in the city of Richmond.89
The Court noted that the Richmond City Council failed to find
that the local government discriminated against minority-owned
businesses. Justice O'Connor stated that the council's findings of
widespread discrimination in the construction industry "cannot jus-
tify a rigid racial quota ... ."90 The Court rejected the city's reliance
on the disparity between the percentage of contracts awarded to mi-
nority contractors and the percentage of minorities living in the city
of Richmond. The Court noted that the percentage of contracts
awarded to minority firms should be compared to the percentage of
qualified minority contractors.9 ' Justice O'Connor also stated that
the set-aside was not narrowly tailored to remedy prior discrimina-
tion. The Court observed that "there does not appear to have been
any consideration of the use of race-neutral means to increase mi-
nority business participation" and that the program's waiver proce-
dure was inflexible.92
love v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448 (1980). Croson also illustrates the split between the
recent conservative appointees and the senior liberal Justices. See Hoogland & Mc-
Glothen, supra note 29, at 7.
86. Croson, 109 S. Ct. at 719. Justice O'Connor observed that the fourteenth
amendment was actually intended to constrain state power. Her opinion concluded
that framers of the fourteenth amendment "desired to place clear limits on the states'
use of race as a criterion for legislative action, and to have the federal courts enforce
those limitations." Id.
87. Id. at 720 (citing Wygant, 476 U.S. at 274).
88. Id. at 720. Justice O'Connor reaffirmed "that the standard of review under
the Equal Protection Clause is not dependent on the race of those burdened or bene-
fited... " Id. (citing Wygant, 476 U.S. at 279-80).
89. Id. at 721-22. In Richmond, blacks made up half the population and five of
the nine city council seats were held by blacks. Apparently, the Court did not take
kindly to the fact that the set-aside program was adopted by a black majority. Id. at
722.
90. Id. at 724. The Court said that the 30% quota had no reasonable relation to
any injury suffered by anyone. Id.
91. Id. at 725.
92. Id. at 728-29.
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Justice Marshall criticized the majority's adoption of the strict scru-
tiny standard and the majority's analysis of the evidence presented
by Richmond.93 In his dissent, Justice Marshall observed that the
great disparity between the use of minority contractors and the pres-
ence of minorities in the general population was so great that more
detailed statistics were unnecessary. He argued that the Court
should show greater deference to the city council's deliberations and
that "when the legislatures and leaders of cities with histories of per-
vasive discrimination testify that past discrimination has infected
their industries, armchair cynicism like that exercised by the majority
has no place."04 Finally, Justice Marshall criticized the Court's reli-
ance upon the fourteenth amendment to distinguish Fullilove. He
stated that the fourteenth amendment does not suggest the states
could not work "alongside the Federal Government in the fight
against discrimination and its effects."95
After Croson, it became clear that minority set-aside programs es-
tablished by state and local governments would have to pass the
strict scrutiny standard. The Croson Court artfully limited Fullilove
solely to set-aside plans enacted by Congress, while it seriously
eroded the ability of state and local government to enact similar
programs.
III. A STATE OR LOCAL GOVERNMENT'S BURDEN AFTER CROSON
Under the strict scrutiny standard required by Croson, state and lo-
cal governments face an onerous burden.9 6 In adopting a race-con-
scious set-aside program, a legislative authority must ensure that the
program meets the high standards of validity established in Croson.
First, a state or local government must demonstrate a compelling
state interest to justify a race-conscious program. The Supreme
Court has established that remedying present effects of past discrimi-
93. Id. at 752-53. Rather than the "daunting" strict scrutiny standard, Marshall
prefers to examine only whether the set-aside program served " 'important govern-
ment objectives' " and was " 'substantially related to the achievement of those objec-
tives.' " Id. at 743 (quoting Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 359
(1978)).
94. Id. at 749.
95. Id. at 757.
96. See Hoogland & McGlothen, supra note 29, at 16. The strict scrutiny test im-
poses a burden of proof similar to that faced by plaintiffs under Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964. Id. at 6. After sustaining their prima facie burden, Title VII
plaintiffs always bear the ultimate burden of persuasion, and they must refute de-
fendant's theories and explanations by a preponderance of evidence. Id. at 15. Like-
wise, a state or local entity must not only make out its own prima facie case based
upon past discrimination but must also refute alternative race-neutral measures to
remedy affects of past discrimination.
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nation is a compelling purpose.97 However, the legislative body may
not act upon general knowledge of societal discrimination. Rather,
the government must find that the government itself discriminated
against minority businesses in the past and that effects of past dis-
crimination persist.98
Second, the legislative body must produce adequate findings of
past discrimination. This burden may be satisfied by statistical proof
which will be subjected to close scrutiny. The relevant labor market
for set-asides is the business community, not the general popula-
tion.99 Therefore, an adequate finding must compare the percent-
age of all businesses owned by minorities and the percentage of
minority businesses receiving government contracts.' 00
Third, race conscious preferences must be narrowly tailored to
remedy the effects of prior discrimination.101 The state or local en-
tity should consider: (1) the effectiveness of race-neutral alternatives;
(2) the relationship between the set-aside goal and the percentage of
minority businesses; (3) the adequacy of waiver provisions; (4) the
duration of the program; and (5) the program's effect on nonmi-
nority contractors.10 2
IV. AFTERMATH OF CROSON IN MINNESOTA
Croson had a devastating impact on set-aside programs nationwide.
Because of Croson, many programs were overturned or suspended by
courts. Many city, county, and state governments re-evaluated or
simply suspended their set-aside programs.103
The Minnesota Department of Administration initially reacted to
Croson by stating that, due to differences between the Richmond plan
97. Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 499-500 (1980) (Powell, J., concurring).
98. See Wygant v.Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 272 (1986). In Wygant, the
Court confirmed that any racial classification, even if it favors minorities, must be
subject to " 'a most searching examination to make sure that it does not conflict with
constitutional guarantees.' " Id. at 273-74 (quoting Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 491). The
Wygant Court, however, stopped short of adopting the strict scrutiny test.
99. Id. at 275.
100. In Wygant, the Court stated that statistical evidence of prior discrimination
should involve the percentage of qualified workers in the relevant labor market. Id.
101. Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 498 (Powell, J., concurring).
102. Id. at 510-14. These factors are not exhaustive or exclusive and have been
used by the courts only as guidelines. See, e.g., South Fla. Chapter, Associated Gen.
Contractors of America, Inc. v. Metropolitan Dade County, 723 F.2d 846, 855 n. 1
(1 th Cir. 1984) (factors serving as a helpful guide in determining whether statute
violates equal protection clause, regardless of which standard of review is used), cert.
denied, 469 U.S. 871 (1984); see also Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal. v. City of San
Francisco, 619 F. Supp. 334, 341 (N.D. Cal. 1985), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 813 F.2d
922 (9th Cir. 1987).
103. Pear, Courts Are Undoing Effects to Aid Minority Contractors, N.Y. Times, July 16,
1990, at Al, col. 1.
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and the Minnesota set-aside program, the Minnesota plan would not
be affected by the Supreme Court decision.104 Then, on March 7,
1989, the Supreme Court affirmed a Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals'
decision that invalidated a Michigan set-aside program similar to
Minnesota's program. In Michigan Road Builder's Association v. Milli-
ken,10 5 the Sixth Circuit applied a strict scrutiny test to Michigan's
racially-based program and a less stringent intermediate test to the
gender-based program.10 6
When the Supreme Court affirmed Milliken,10 7 it was obvious that
the Minnesota program would not pass constitutional muster. Thus,
the Minnesota Legislature replaced the state set-aside programs with
an interim program based not on gender or race, but rather based on
the economic status of the business.108
The legislation enacted in June 1989 created a Small Business Pro-
curement Commission to propose changes to conform to the recent
United States Supreme Court decisions.10 9 The Small Business Pro-
curement Commission was required to assure that minority and wo-
men's businesses knew of the existence and purpose of the
commission, to determine the need for race- and gender-based busi-
ness assistance programs, to recommend appropriate statutory or
regulatory changes, and to recommend programs targeted to small
businesses in need of assistance. 110 The legislation also established
a race- and gender-neutral program for economically disadvantaged
small businesses (EDSBs).III The Department of Administration im-
plemented the set-aside for Economically Disadvantaged Businesses
104. See Carlson, State Law Might Withstand Ruling on Racial Quotas, Minneapolis
Star Tribune, Jan. 24, 1989, at 4A, col. 1.
105. 834 F.2d 583, 594-95 (6th Cir. 1987), aff'd, 109 S. Ct. 1333 (1989).
106. The intermediate test first requires establishing through findings of discrimi-
nation that an important governmental interest is served by the legislation. These
findings need not be as detailed as those supporting a race-based program. The
Sixth Circuit did not address the second requirement that the legislative means be
"narrowly tailored" and "substantially related" to the goal of "eradicating the pres-
ent effects of prior discrimination." Id. at 595 n.15.
107. The Supreme Court affirmed the decision without a written opinion. Milliken
v. Michigan Rd. Builders Ass'n, 109 S. Ct. 1333 (1989). In declaring the set-aside pro-
gram unconstitutional, the court of appeals found no evidence that the state had
discriminated against women in the awarding of public contracts. Milliken, 834 F.2d
at 595.
108. Act approvedJune 2, 1989, ch. 352, sec. 14, 1989 Minn. Laws 3178 (amend-
ing MINN. STAT. § 161.321, subd. 2 (1988)).
109. Id. sec. 1, subd. 1.
110. Id. The Commission was to report its findings and recommendations for leg-
islative action to the governor and the legislature by January 31, 1990. It ceased to
function after that date. Id. sec. 1, subd. 3.
111. Id. sec. 14, subd. 2. Under this program, qualified businesses were awarded a
five percent preference in the amount bid on state contracts and purchases. Id. The
Department of Administration may also set goals requiring prime contractors to sub-
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(EDBs) while awaiting the report of the Small Business Procurement
Commission. 121
V. REPORT OF MINNESOTA LEGISLATIVE COMMISSION ON SMALL
BUSINESS PROCUREMENT
The Small Business Procurement Commission submitted its report
to the Minnesota Legislature on January 31, 1990.113 The commis-
sion recommended that the legislature enact a race- and gender-
based program." 14 The Commission's main task was to gather suffi-
cient data to support its findings and recommendations. Minority
and female business owners and representatives of groups such as
business development organizations, trade associations, and civil
rights agencies testified at the Commission's public hearings. The
Commission also received the Department of Administration's study,
affidavits, and other documentation that showed discrimination.'15
The evidence received by the Commission was of two types: anecdo-
tal evidence and statistical evidence.
A. Anecdotal Evidence
Persons testified via direct testimony and affidavits on the perva-
siveness of discrimination in Minnesota's business industry. The wit-
contract portions of contracts exceeding $200,000 to EDB contractors. Id. sec. 3,
subd. 6.
112. As part of the interim program legislation, the legislature directed the
Department of Administration to study and make recommendations on four
questions:
1. Is there sufficient justification under a strict-scrutiny standard to estab-
lish a narrowly tailored purchasing program for the benefit of any so-
cially disadvantaged groups?
2. Should the definition of small business contained in Minnesota Statutes
[§1 645.445 be revised?
3. Are there alternative programs to stimulate growth opportunities for
small businesses?
4. Is it feasible to establish a preference program incorporating urban and
rural areas of high unemployment?
MINN. LEGIS. COMM'N ON SMALL Bus. PROCUREMENT, A FOOT IN THE DOOR: ENSURING
FAIR MARKET ACCESS FOR FEMALE- AND MINORITY-OWNED BUSINESSES 6-7 (1990)
[hereinafter FOOT IN THE DOOR]. See Act approved June 2, 1989, ch. 352, 1989 Minn.
Laws 3169 (amending and repealing a number of statutes regulating purchasing from
small businesses), amended by Act approved May 3, 1990, ch. 541, 1990 Minn. Laws
1457 (amending and repealing statutes concerning certain small businesses and busi-
nesses located in economically disadvantaged areas).
113. Senator Betty Adkins and Representative Richard Jefferson co-chaired the
Commission. Other members were: Senators Cal Larson and John Marty; Represent-
atives Sidney Pauly and Ted Winter; Fermin L. Aragon; Georgene Bergstrom; Don-
ald A. Crowther; Diane M. Morey; Gae Veit; and Deputy Attorney General Linda F.
Close. See FOOT IN THE DOOR, supra note 112.
114. Id. at 62.
115. Id. at 6.
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nesses represented Indians, Aleuts, Asians, Hispanics, blacks and
women."l 6 The witnesses described their personal experiences of
discrimination based on race or gender. 17 Witnesses identified dis-
crimination within the construction, commodities and service indus-
tries.' i8 Racial minorities and women owning construction-related
businesses identified prime contractors as the major source of dis-
criminatory treatment. 19 Other sources of discrimination identified
include government agencies, bonding agents, lending institutions,
suppliers and trade unions.12o Witnesses also spoke of exclusion be-
cause of race or gender from "the informal but vital networks"121
through which white, . male-owned businesses obtain work
opportunities. 122
Witnesses also gave examples of discriminatory practices. Prime
contractors were accused of setting different bid requirements for a
minority-owned firm than for others,123 using "good faith" post-
cards and phone calls to give the appearance of nondiscrimina-
tion,124 and sending late bid solicitations.125 Other problems facing
minority-owned businesses include finding qualified professional
116. Id. at 9.
117. Warren McLean, Executive Vice President of the Metropolitan Economic De-
velopment Association, an association providing business consulting services to mi-
nority-owned businesses, spoke of two instances in 1989 in which his association
helped clients reverse discriminatory decisions by government agencies. Id. Jan
Morlock, Vice President of Business Development for Chart/WEDCO, an organiza-
tion providing business consulting, education, and loan packaging to women, also
testified regarding discrimination experienced by women, especially minority wo-
men. Id. at 10.
118. Id. at 11.
119. Id. at 11-12. The testimony reflected the link between the opportunity to
learn a trade or business and entrepreneurial potential in that field. Id. at 12.
120. Id. at 11-12. Minority and female contractors consistently had a more diffi-
cult time getting bonded and securing loans from financial institutions. Suppliers
also discriminated by charging higher prices to minority firms. See generally id. at 10-
24.
121. Id. at 11. An informal network was referred to as the "good old boys net-
work" by a Hispanic contractor. He stated that it is difficult to prove that this net-
work is a source of discrimination because the perpetrators protect themselves very
well. Id. at 18.
122. Id. at 11. A black contractor testified that in the pipe-fitters local union, 90%
of the minority members are unemployed compared to only 6% of the white mem-
bers. Id. at 12.
123. Id. at 13.
124. These contractors never intend to use a minority-owned firm; the calls are
made only to create a record demonstrating a "good faith effort" to use an SED. Id.
125. Id. at 16. A contractor who receives late bid solicitations is at a disadvantage
in developing a timely proposal. The project director of the Indian Business Devel-
opment Center of the Minnesota Chippewa Tribe stated that a sampling of letters
received by the center in the spring of 1989 revealed that 66% of the letters arrived
within eight days or less of the bid-letting. Id.
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employees; obtaining equity, debt and start-up financing; and secur-
ing liability insurance and bonding.126 Many witnesses also stated
that they only received government contracts through the SED pro-
grams. Since the SED program was suspended, bid solicitations
from government agencies had significantly declined.127
The Commission also identified employment discrimination and
exclusion from construction opportunities as reasons for the inability
of minorities and women to form businesses.128 Minorities were
hired primarily to fill minority quotas, but as soon as layoffs became
necessary, minorities and women were the first to be laid off.129 Mi-
norities and women were also grossly under-represented in union
membership and state-sponsored apprenticeship programs. A study
conducted by the Minneapolis Civil Rights Department revealed that
the disparities are the result of discriminatory patterns and practices
within the construction industry.130 In addition, female contractors
complained of not being taken seriously in the construction industry.
They were often required to have a man cosign on their loan re-
quests. They also complained of having to work twice as hard to
prove they could do the job.' 3 '
Minority- and female-owned firms dealing in commodities and
services reported virtually the same type of discrimination exper-
ienced by contractors.' 32 In addition, government buyers, private
sector buyers and purchasing agents have greater opportunities to
discriminate.133 Minority-owned firms are also disadvantaged by
their lack of purchasing power. Thus, it is more difficult for them to
compete with large nonminority-owned suppliers who are able to of-
fer volume discounts.134
126. Id. at 18.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 24-27. "No leap of faith is needed to understand that a person denied
the opportunity to learn a particular trade or skill is not very likely to start up and run
a firm in that trade or skill area." Id. at 24.
129. Id. at 26.
130. Id. at 25 (citing MINNEAPOLIS CIVIL RIGHTS DEPARTMENT, BARRIERS TO PRO-
GRESS: PEOPLE OF COLOR AND WOMEN AND MINNEAPOLIS CONSTRUCTION OCCUPATIONS
1989).
131. Id. at 21.
132. Id. at 27. A witness testified that buyers are not interested in purchasing
from minorities. Contracts go to friends, fellow club members, or whomever they
favor. Id. at 27-29. A black business owner testified that he submitted a low bid on a
services contract with the University of Minnesota. He was not awarded the contract
and, believing the contract was denied because of his race, he retained an attorney
and eventually received the contract. Id. at 34. An Asian owner of a computer sys-
tems and services business stated that organizations were reluctant to buy high tech-
nology products from minority-owned firms. Id. at 29.
133. Id. at 27-28.
134. Id. at 28.
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The Commission gathered statistical evidence from the Depart-
ment of Administration, trade association membership and appren-
ticeship programs, a report prepared by the Hubert H. Humphrey
Institute's Regional Issues Forum, and other data reflecting the soci-
etal experiences of women and minorities that affect their compe-
tence to form and run businesses.
1. The Department of Administration Study
The Department of Administration submitted a report for the fis-
cal year 1988 which provided a breakdown of set-asides, preferences,
and purchases awarded to socially or economically disadvantaged
(SED) businesses. The report revealed that the total dollar amount
awarded under the set-asides and preference programs exceeded the
goals set in the programs.l3 5 Nonetheless, of the 10.07% dollar
amount awarded to SED vendors, 1.5% was awarded to minorities,
2.27% to females and 6.19% to businesses in labor surplus areas. 3 6
In response to four questions posed by the Legislature, 137 the De-
partment found: (1) there is sufficient evidence of discrimination,
both in government purchasing and private activities, to justify a nar-
rowly tailored purchasing program for the benefit of socially disad-
vantaged groups;' 3 8 (2) the definition of small business should be
revised to recognize the different competitive conditions within the
various types of business;139 (3) while there are alternative programs
to stimulate growth opportunities for small businesses, the effective-
135. 1988 DEP'T OF ADMIN., MINN. SMALL Bus. PROCUREMENT PROGRAM ANN. REP.
at 1.
136. Id at 2. Of the total volume procured, 12.9% was awarded to SED vendors,
4.08% to minorities, 4.43% to females and 4.00% to businesses in labor surplus
areas. Id.
137. See supra note 112.
138. FOOT IN THE DOOR, supra note 112, at 38. The report showed, however, that
the reported discrimination differed among gender and racial groups and for each
category of product or service. The study also found that, although past set-aside
programs benefitted minority- and female-owned firms in several ways, the programs
did not have a larger impact on government underutilization of those firms because
firms located in labor surplus areas received a disproportionate share of the contracts
let under the programs. Id. at 39. To increase opportunities for government con-
tract awards, the study suggested raising the purchaser preference for firms qualify-
ing under race and gender standards to a level higher than the preference granted to
firms qualifying under the labor surplus or county median income standards. Id. at
40.
139. Id. The Department of Administration believed that an industry-specific defi-
nition of small business would provide a more accurate identification of firms that are
considered small within a particular industry. Id.
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ness of such programs is not clear;140 and (4) it is feasible to estab-
lish a preference program incorporating urban and rural areas of
high unemployment even where such areas are smaller than cities or
counties. 141
Finally, the Department of Administration recommended that the
legislature enact a race- and gender-based program. 142
2. Trade Association Membership and Apprenticeship Programs
The report compared the proportions of female- and minority-
owned firms in Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) codes with
minority and female membership in trade associations.14 For exam-
ple, the report showed that the proportion of female-owned firms in
selected SIC codes ranges from about 19% to more than 30%.
Compare these ratios with the female-membership in trade associa-
tions which ranges from zero to slightly greater than 12%.'44
With regard to apprenticeship programs, the Commission as-
sumed that there was a connection between access to training and
employment in the trades and the ability to start up and run busi-
nesses in those trades.'45 The report, however, stated that the par-
ticipation rates of women and minorities in apprenticeship programs
fall short of the affirmative action goals adopted by the Minnesota
Department of Labor and Industry's Voluntary Apprenticeship
Division. 146
3. Other Evidence
A report prepared by the Hubert H. Humphrey Institute's Re-
gional Issues Forum 14 7 found that although minorities constitute
140. Id. at 41. The Department of Administration questioned the focus and par-
ticipation levels of alternative programs. Id.
141. Id. at 42. The report suggested that firms located in such areas could be
granted the same kind of preference given to firms located in labor surplus areas and
counties below the median income. Id.
142. Id. at 39. For other recommendations by the Commission, see id. at 39-42.
143. Id. at 43-46. The Commission requested membership information by gender
and race from 33 construction trade associations in Minnesota, and nine responded.
Id. at 43.
144. Id.
145. Id. at 46.
146. Id. The Apprenticeship Division decided that participation rates in appren-
ticeship programs should be 11.6% for minorities and 21% for women. Between
1980 and 1988, women actually constituted 4.1% of all persons who entered appren-
ticeship programs. Minority males comprised only 5.7% of the total. The average
completion rate for all apprenticeship programs is 48%. White females had the high-
est completion rate of 50%. Thirty-two percent of the black males who entered the
programs completed them. Only 9% of the black females completed their programs.
Id. at 46-47.
147. The forum was established by the Northwest Area Foundation and it studied
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nearly 7% of the region's population, " 'sales of minority-owned en-
terprises are only 0.1% to 0.8% of the total sales' within each of the
eight states."4 8 The Institute's report also compared Minnesota mi-
nority businesses to all businesses by industry.'4 9 The data showed
that while minority firms made up 1.5% of construction firms and
7.1% of service firms, their total sales for the particular industries
were only 0.1% and 0.8% respectively.150
Other statistics reviewed by the commission included the Minne-
sota household income by racial groups, unemployment rate and
school drop-out rate. Minority groups had lower average household
income and higher unemployment rates than whites.15, Also, a com-
parison of school enrollments within each racial group, showed that
minority students had higher drop-out rates than their white
counterparts. 1 5 2
The Commission also looked at programs in other jurisdictions.
The Commission found most set-aside or preference programs en-
acted since Croson in other jurisdictions were of three basic types: (1)
those targeted at all small businesses; (2) those targeted at economi-
cally disadvantaged businesses; and (3) facially neutral programs
with race and gender used as a set-aside criteria.153
After Croson, race- and gender-based legislation was enacted in
King County, Washington and San Francisco, California.154 Bothju-
risdictions found statistical evidence of underrepresentation of fe-
male- and minority-owned firms in government contracting and
subcontracting.155 The King County legislation withstood chal-
lenges in federal district court. 156
minority-owned business enterprises in an eight-state region including Minnesota.
Id. at 54.
148. Id. at 56 (citing Minority Business in the Northwest United States, HUBERT H.
HUMPHREY INST. PUB. AFF. REGIONAL ISSUES F. (April 1989).
149. Id.
150. Id. Data also shows the Minnesota minority firm count and sales by industry
indexed to minority population. Id.
151. Id. at 50-51. In 1979, Indian males had the highest unemployment rate of
39.6%, followed by black males at 30%. In the same year, only 15.3% of white males
and females were unemployed. Id. at 52.
152. Id. at 53-54.
153. Id. at 58. The first approach has been used in Arizona, Maryland and Mon-
tana. The Oregon and Minnesota programs for economically disadvantaged busi-
nesses follow the second approach. The third approach was implemented in three
cities: Wilmington, Delaware; Birmingham, Alabama; and Milwaukee, Wisconsin. Id.
at 58-60.
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C. Commission Findings and Legislative Recommendations
The Commission's most significant finding is "[t]hat public and
private purchasing agents, business owners, contractors, financial in-
stitutions, and surety agents have discriminated and do discriminate
against female- and minority-owned businesses doing business with
the State of Minnesota, on the basis of the gender and race of the
owners of these businesses."157 The Commission found that the
program for economically disadvantaged businesses did not ade-
quately benefit female- and minority-owned firms. The report con-
cluded "[t]hat race and gender-neutral measures, by themselves will
not eliminate the effects of discrimination by governmental agencies
and private businesses."l58
Based on its findings, the Commission recommended that "[a]
race- and gender-based program should be enacted by the Legisla-
ture that reflects the varying populations of female- and minority-
owned firms by industry.'"59 The Commission also recommended
that "[flirms qualifying under race and gender standards should be
granted a 6- percent purchasing preference and firms qualifying
under the labor surplus or county median income standards should
be granted a 4- percent preference."160 In addition, the Commis-
sion recommended various race- and gender-neutral measures
geared towards assisting small businesses.161
D. Are the Findings of the Small Business Procurement Commission
Sufficient to Support a Race- and Gender-Based Program?
To satisfy Croson, before enacting a race- and gender-based set-
aside program, the legislature must find a compelling state interest
to remedy the effects of past discrimination, then narrowly tailor the
program to serve that governmental interest.162 The small business
procurement report showed that the legislature has a compelling
state interest in redressing prior discrimination, by disclosing evi-
dence of such discrimination. The report contains testimony from
individuals about their personal experiences of being discriminated
against due to their race or gender. Individuals gave specific exam-
ples of discriminatory practices. Some witnesses testified they never
received government contracts except on set-aside programs.16 3 Ad-
ditionally, the Department of Administration admitted that the rec-
ord of government purchasing evinced discrimination.
157. Id at 61.
158. Id. at 62.
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. Id. at 63-65.
162. See supra text accompanying notes 96-102.
163. See supra text accompanying notes 116-34 and accompanying text.
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In further establishing a compelling state interest in remedying
past discrimination, the Commission's report noted a disparity be-
tween the percentage of minority businesses and the percentage of
total sales by those minority industries. 164 Specifically, the statistics
show the disparity between the percentage of minority firms in the
construction industry and the total percentage sales for the industry.
Finally, the statistics show the disparity between the proportion of
minority- and female-owned firms and minority and female member-
ship in trade associations.165
To ensure narrow tailoring of the set-aside programs, the Com-
mission advised that the programs reflect the varying populations of
female- and minority-owned firms by industry.166 The Commission
also recommended basing the categories of purchasing that should
qualify for a race- and gender-based procurement on the number of
minority- and female-owned firms.167 The Commission did not pro-
pose rigid quotas, but only suggested percentage purchasing prefer-
ences. 168 The Commission recommended that government agencies
have discretion and flexibility in using preferences or set-asides
and that any goal-setting process contain waiver provisions.169 Fi-
nally, the Commission advised that a biannual report on the imple-
mentation of purchasing programs should be submitted to the
Legislature.170
The Commission tailored its report to the requirements of Croson.
Consequently, the new legislation was enacted without opposition.
However, arguments do exist against adopting any race- and gender-
based programs in Minnesota.
E. Arguments Against Adopting a Race- and Gender-Based
Set-Aside Program
Opponents of race- and gender-based set-aside programs could
argue that the Minnesota Legislative Commission Small Business Re-
port does not show a compelling state interest in remedying the ef-
fects of past discrimination in Minnesota. The Commission accepted
the testimony of witnesses without verifying the authenticity of the
claimed discrimination. Most of the discrimination experienced by
the witnesses came from private individuals and businesses instead
of government agencies.17i
164. See supra text accompanying notes 147-50.
165. See supra text accompanying notes 143-44.
166. FOOT IN THE DOOR, supra note 112, at 62.
167. Id.
168. See supra note 160 and accompanying text.
169. FOOT IN THE DOOR, supra note 112, at 63.
170. Id.
171. The witnesses testified they experienced discrimination from prime contrac-
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The statistical evidence in the report may not be sufficient grounds
for imposing a percentage preference and the percentages recom-
mended by the Commission may be somewhat arbitrary. Further-
more, the numbers may not be conclusive proof of prior
discrimination since there might be other reasons for the disparity.
Finally, a set-aside program may be unnecessary because most of
the problems identified by minority- and female-owned businesses
are virtually the same problems facing all small businesses. Thus,
critics could assert that race- and gender-neutral measures targeted
towards all small businesses would suffice.
However, even if most of the discriminatory practices were perpe-
trated by private individuals and industries, the government is a
passive participant in discriminatory practices because it awards con-
tracts to industries that discriminate.172 Additionally, no statistics
can specify with mathematical certainty the percentage preference or
set-aside that would remedy the effects of past discrimination. The
Legislature devised a reasonable percentage by using the statistics
available. Finally, race-neutral measures recommended by the Com-
mission cannot by themselves redress the effects of past
discrimination. 173
VI. THE NEW PROGRAMS
As a result of the Small Business Procurement Commission's re-
port, the Legislature enacted a revised small business procurement
program.' 74 The new Act established programs for public purchas-
ing from the following types of businesses: small businesses; small
consultant, professional and technical businesses; target group busi-
nesses; and businesses in economically disadvantaged areas.' 75 In
proposing the bill, a member of the Small Business Commission
stated:
I believe it is necessary for the legislature to enact a procurement
program that remedies the discrimination brought to our attention
by the report of the Small Business Procurement Commission. I
believe that the program recommended in this bill, including race
and gender conscious measures is necessary and narrowly tailored
tors, lending institutions, bonding agents and purchasing agents-none of which are
government agencies. FoOT IN THE DooR, supra note 112, at 61.
172. Id.
173. Congress found race-neutral measures ineffective when passing the Public
Works Employment Act. For suggestions on race-neutral alternatives, see Suggs, Re-
thinking Minority Business Development Strategies, 25 HAR. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 101 (1990)
(arguing that alternatives have advantages over set-asides).
174. MINN. STAT. § 16B.19 (1990) (The new law repealed the interim race- and
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to remedy the discrimination found by the commission.1 76
The program for purchasing from targeted group businesses con-
tains race- and gender-conscious measures. Targeted groups
include women, persons with disabilities and or specific minori-
ties.17 7 The Commissioner may award small targeted group busi-
nesses a 6% preference in bidding for specified goods or services.178
The Commissioner may set aside a purchase of goods or services for
award only to small targeted group businesses.179 Also, in awarding
a construction or services contract, the Commissioner may set goals
that require prime contractors to subcontract a part of the contract
to small targeted group businesses.180
With regard to procurement from small businesses generally, the
Commissioner must ensure that small businesses receive at least
25% of anticipated total procurement of goods and services.81
Small businesses located in economically disadvantaged areas may
also receive up to a 4% preference in the amount bid on state
procurement. 182
Although the program for targeted group purchasing contains
race- and gender-conscious measures, the program does not set con-
crete guidelines for granting preferences to any particular group. In
fact, most of the legislation in the new programs is permissive and
gives the Commissioner of Administration immense discretion in ap-
plying the programs.' 8 3
Also, the new programs are more narrowly tailored than former
plans. Targeted group businesses are designated within a purchas-
ing program if "there is a statistical disparity between the percent-
age of purchasing from businesses owned by group members and the
representation of business owned by group members among all busi-
nesses in the state in the purchasing category."' 8 4 The Commis-
176. Minutes of the Comm. on Gov't Operations, Minn. House of Representatives
(Mar. 14, 1990) (Statement of Rep. Jefferson).
177. MINN. STAT. § 16B.19, subd, 2b(a) (1990).
178. Id. § 16B.19, subd. 2c(a).
179. Id. § 16B.19, subd. 2b(a).
180. Id. § 16B.19, subd. 2c(c).
181. Id. § 16B.19, subd. 1.
182. Id. The Commissioner may designate targeted neighborhoods as economi-
cally disadvantaged areas. Id.
183. The Commissioner, however, is advised by a Small Business and Targeted
Group Procurement Advisory Council which reviews Commission reports and hears
complaints and grievances of small businesses in targeted groups. Id. § 16B.20,
subd. 3.
184. Id. § 16B.19, subd. 2b(a). The Commissioner must assure that the percent-
age of purchasing from each type of targeted group is proportional to its representa-
tion in the state. Id. § 16B.19, subd. 2a. Furthermore, the definition of a small
business is no longer a general definition. The statute requires the Commissioner to
establish separate definitions for various sizes of businesses. Id. § 16B.19, subd. la.
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sioner may award preferences of up to 6% of the total bid amount in
discrete contracts for specified goods and services.185 Moreover, the
Commissioner may only limit bidding on contracts to target groups
where the Commissioner determines that at least three target busi-
nesses are likely to bid.186
Greater flexibility is another virtue of the new programs. When
placing their bids, prime contractors are no longer required to list
the names of minority- or female-owned businesses they would use.
Instead, the Commissioner may use financial incentives or penalties
for prime contractors who exceed or fail to meet the goals.187 Agen-
cies are encouraged to purchase from small targeted group busi-
nesses when making purchases that are not subject to competitive
bidding.188 Also, the authority to subcontract small business is no
longer limited to contracts in excess of $200,000.189 Of course, the
programs would not be complete without retaining race-neutral
measures that benefit all small businesses.190
Finally, the legislation requires an ongoing assessment of the pro-
grams. The Commissioner of Administration must submit annual
and quarterly reports on the progress being made toward the objec-
tives and goals of these programs.' 9' The Commissioner of Trade
and Economic Development and the Commissioner of Administra-
tion must also undertake various studies to evaluate the
programs. 192
The Legislature has carefully enacted programs that can withstand
judicial scrutiny. However, the effectiveness of the new programs is
yet to be determined.
CONCLUSION
Instead of sounding the death knell for Minnesota's race and gen-
der set-aside programs, Croson revived the state's interest in ensuring
185. Id. § 16B.19, subd. 2c(a).
186. Id. § 16B.19, subd. 2c(b).
187. Id. § 16B.19, subd. 2c(c). Waiver provisions are also required in the event of
unavailability of qualified small targeted group businesses. Id.
188. Id. § 16B.07, subd. 6.
189. See MINN. STAT. § 16B.19, subd. 6 (1989), repealed by Act approved May 3,
1990, ch. 541, sec. 3, 1990 Minn. Laws 1457-61. The elimination of the $200,000
requirement provides more flexibility in the purchasing process.
190. The Bureau of Small Business was created in 1979 to provide information
and assistance to small businesses generally. The Bureau was also formed to award
contracts to businesses in targeted areas. These purposes remain unaffected. See
MINN. STAT. § 116J.68 (1990).
191. Id. § 16B.21. State agencies involved in the programs are also required to
submit reports. Id. § 16B.21, subd. 3.
192. Id. The studies were to be completed byJanuary 15, 1991. Act adopted May
3, 1990, ch. 541, sec. 28, 1990 Minn. Laws 1476.
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that minority- and female-owned businesses receive a fair share of
state business. Croson prompted the Legislature to examine the small
business procurement programs and to find their shortcomings. In
spite of the shortcomings, set-asides are an important weapon used
in the government's efforts to combat discrimination in the market-
place. Concerted efforts must be made to ensure that the new pro-
grams are administered in a fashion that promotes equality of
business opportunities in the state. Minnesota must not back away
from its commitment to end discrimination.
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